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Abstract 
Whilst the technical challenges of incorporating new technologies into buildings are continually discussed, 
the managerial challenges are less well understood. The issue is acute as many of these complex 
technologies such as advanced building skins (ABS) are integrated with the building structure, rather than 
being bolt-on additions. Building integrated photovoltaic technologies (BIPV) are an example of ABS and 
pose challenges for construction professionals. Research has until now understood BIPV through idealised 
project management processes, but with little empirical research. Using a socio-technical approach, this 
research aims to understand the “real world” of construction projects and to explore how practitioners make 
BIPV integration a reality. This research follows three building projects where BIPV was specified, following 
the negotiations, decision making and institutional logics, which play out. The implications of project 
management demands and conventions on the integration of the technology are explored, identifying 
institutional obstacles to integrating BIPV into the building. Findings include changing interests and 
requirements shaping the technology, friction interfaces between the technology and the other building 
elements and conflicting priorities of project management conventions and technical details. The importance 
of this research is to deconstruct the practicalities of incorporating BIPV into building projects so that 
construction professionals, technology developers and suppliers can understand the challenges and 
opportunities occurring as ABS are integrated into the building envelope. 
Keywords: BIPV, project management, integration, construction projects, performance gap  
 
1. Introduction 
Advanced building skins (ABS) form a group of innovative technologies that are integrated with and form part 
of the building.  Discussions around ABS often centre on energy generation efficiency, reduced energy 
consumption in the built environment, and other associated benefits.  Increasingly however, practitioners and 
academics acknowledge that the drive for the latest technology and the pursuit of technical excellence has 
not been enough to secure the uptake of technology.  ABS might be identified as eco-dressing or associated 
with flagship projects that proudly sport their sustainable credentials without dramatically improving the built 
environment.  This lack of enthusiasm for the adoption of innovative technologies has been attributed to the 
performance gap between boilerplate performance and delivered performance, and this has led to a focus on 
technical improvements [1].  Whilst technological improvements are needed, that is not enough, with a 
growing acknowledgement within the project management community that managerial challenges associated 
with the practicalities of incorporating complex technologies are key but less well understood [2].   
Turning to BIPV and to the practicalities of managing the construction of buildings, it is easy to see how 
technological performance and construction project management processes diverge.  Over time project 
management logics have developed within the construction sector which pre-dispose project managers to 
split the technology along conventional project lines, blurring the distinction between the function of the 
technology (energy generation) and the other “normal” components that go to contributing toward a finished 
building.  Thus, the PV cells can be considered as Mechanical artefacts, wiring and inverters as Electrical 
artefacts and the associated windows or façade panels as part of the fabric of the building.  These artificial 
distinctions may seem superficial, but taken within the context of construction projects, can have profound 
effects on the delivery of the technology (BIPV) in terms of functional performance. Construction projects are 
temporary in nature, with multi-disciplinary teams coming together to deliver complex one-off projects, often 
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incorporating new technology [3].  Project work requires complex interrelationships, agreed project 
processes and norms, factors that can work against the incorporation of innovative technologies as project 
management systems are designed to standardise build processes and to make construction projects 
efficient.  This has resulted in prescriptive best management practices to optimise measured team 
performance [4], calls for integrated processes [5] and controlled management of changes [6].  Project 
management research thus tends to address this shift towards integration based upon unrealistic idealised 
and logical project management processes.  This has led to a research focus on optimising project 
management processes rather than developing an understanding of how technical specifications are 
translated into physical artefacts.   
This divergence between the technological focus of Engineers and Product Developers and the emerging 
practicalities of construction project management is not well understood and perhaps explains the tension 
between product design and installed performance.  The aim of this research is therefore to understand the 
“real world” of construction projects and to explore how integration becomes a reality empirically.   
2. Construction projects 
The following section develops how the practicalities of construction project management affect technology 
realisation.  It outlines how construction projects are subdivided into stages, the way that construction 
projects are managed and the implication of these factors for BIPV and other integrated technologies. 
2.1 Project stages 
Building projects in the UK are considered as linear stages in terms of the Royal Institute of British Architects 
(RIBA) plan of work [7].  These stages include: business justification (stage 1), feasibility studies (stage 2), 
project brief (stage 3), concept design (stage 4a and 4b), detail design (stage 5), production information 
(stage 6), mobilisation (stage 7), construction (stage 8), occupation and defects liability period (stage 9) and 
post-occupancy (stage 10).  Each of these 10 stages has a defined set of outcomes and procedures and the 
responsibilities are clearly set out within Codes of Conduct and individual project files.  Formal procedures 
for each stage include contractual arrangements, agreement of tender documents, sign-off procedures on 
designs and drawings etc.  Up to stage 6, the design team comprises of the main contractor and its in-house 
design team, the project architect and a group of contracted consultants who advise, design and scope the 
project.  A critical point is reached during stage 6, when the design team creates ‘work packages’ and sends 
them to suppliers for tender.  It is at this stage that the project schedule is drawn up and responsibilities for 
detail design of work packages are allocated.   
2.2 Construction contracts 
Different types of contract are used to procure building projects and these formalise the way that projects are 
managed and run.  Of these, design and build (D/B) contracts remain dominant within the UK.  D/B is where 
after sanction of a project all the design and construction services of a project are contracted to a single firm.  
The client has a contract with the so-called main contractor who is responsible for managing all aspects of 
the project once it has been sanctioned by the client.  Prior to the D/B contract being put in place, the client 
engages a ‘design team’.  This team scopes out the project, agrees the initial design and develops outline 
costings.  The client approves the design and then appoints the main contractor to run all aspects of the 
project from design through to construction, commissioning and handover.  Members of the initial design 
team may be novated to the main contractor, which means that they work on the project for the main 
contractor for the duration of the project.  In some cases, rather than being novated to the main contractor, 
the architect and design consultant continue to work as independent client advisors, liaising closely with the 
main contractor.  Throughout the remaining project work, the main contractor is responsible for detailing the 
design, appointing suppliers, managing the project and delivering the project on budget and on schedule [7].  
Despite claims to the contrary, it is common for the main contractor’s firm to switch its representative during 
different stages of the project, so the project manager at concept design is likely to be a different project 
manager to the one at detail design and again during mobilisation and construction.  As well as this fluidity of 
personnel, the supply chain can have multiple tiers - thus becoming very complex.  Firms within the supply 
chain serve the main contractor or main suppliers, whilst of course having their own alliances and interests.  
2.3 BIPV and construction projects 
Like many ABS technologies, BIPV consists of many components that have to be matched as part of the 
overall system to deliver efficiency, that system must then become part of the overall building.  Different 
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engineers and product developers typically develop and optimise individual components, rather than teaming 
components together for system performance.  Five main elements of BIPV combine to generate and use 
electricity.  Firstly the solar generation technology (eg PV cells or thin film).  Then the substrate which is 
included into a building element (the panel), followed by the wiring (which connects each generating panels.  
Inverters take the power from the panels and convert the output to AC power.  Finally, the metering system 
that either uses the generated energy within the building or exports the electricity to the grid.  Outline design 
of the BIPV system occurs at stage one of the RIBA process, but often this only extends to the number and 
size of panels needed and the number of inverters required.  Detail design of a system may only be carried 
out after stage 6, when the work has been allocated to work packages and the individual contractors begin to 
deliver their portions of the project.  The matching of components required for efficient technological 
performance of the BIPV system does not occur in a vacuum, instead, it is set against all the other 
considerations for design and project management of the whole building.   
At the stage of work package definition, questions arise over how conventional practices fit with emerging 
integrated technologies such as BIPV.  Conventional project management logics of splitting work into 
mechanical, electrical and façade packages are in tension with procuring an integrated BIPV system – at 
what point does the BIPV system stop and the façade package start? Where do responsibilities for the 
connection of BIPV to the main electrical system occur? Who has responsibility for matching the inverters to 
the BIPV cells?  The punctuated nature of responsibilities and the diverse supply chain in projects serve to 
strengthen the perceived importance of project procedures and practices, while in reality these are in tension 
with the integrated decision-making that is needed in projects that incorporate integrated, complex 
technologies such as BIPV.  The main contractor has flexibility to interpret the project stages and procedures  
in many different ways, focussing upon efficient project processes or maximising the output of technologies.  
The interconnectedness of component design, together with construction project characteristics of staged 
procurement, a complex supply chain, conflicting firm priorities and long lead in times, manifests into a 
tension between delivering a project on time and delivering efficient energy generation. 
3. How to understand the problem 
Construction projects involve temporary teams made up of many different firms, using different processes 
and involve millions of components and technologies.  The uptake process of innovative technologies is 
dynamic, and is governed by institutional logics in terms of contracts, professions, technology specialisations 
and supply chains.  It is clear that the processes of integrating new technology into building projects will have 
effects on the technology, management of the project and on the constitution of the building itself [8].  In 
addition, everyday problem solving involve changes to the design and components used.  These tensions 
are particularly in evidence in the case of ABS and BIPV in particular as they push directly up against 
established logics.  Traditional rational approaches to innovation emphasise technological determinism; 
focussing on the technology and its development, but it is clear that a research approach which considers 
both the technical and social elements of project management within construction is needed.   
3.1 A socio-technical problem 
The inclusion of an innovative technology which is part of the fabric of a building poses several research 
challenges.  The incorporation of such a technology into a construction project necessarily involves 
extensive accommodation at many levels and in many different ways as it interfaces with many aspects of 
the project and its components.  These accommodations are made both to the technology and to the building 
in which it eventually forms, and can be in the form of technical adjustments which involve sets of design and 
solution issues, or of changes to standard designs or ways of working.  The institutional logics are also 
clearly relevant, together with the fragmented and increasingly specialised nature of the stakeholders 
representing these interests.  It is how these practitioners and stakeholders make sense of and experience 
the innovation through negotiation which is the focus of this research.  Technical, design and process-
management issues are often treated as distinct and separate, but in practice are interrelated.  This premise 
of mutual constitution of the technology, the building and the project processes [8] challenges previous 
analytic distinctions between context and innovation and the practices of project managers.  The 
combination of technical and social influences is becoming well recognised as having a particularly important 
contribution to play in understanding the adoption of sustainable innovation within construction projects [9].   
To consider the implications of project management demands and conventions on the integration of the 
technology, the first challenge is to understand the different requirements which the technology and the 
building impose on the project team and on each other.  The second is to explore the different and 
sometimes conflicting interests which arise around the implementation of the technology.  The final challenge 
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is to follow how the problems and tensions which arise in the course of a project are eventually resolved and 
how the technology is incorporated and thus adopted.  These challenges point to the need for fine-grained 
analysis of what occurs when such technologies are introduced and the need for a research approach which 
allows for consideration of both the technical and social aspects of its adoption within the context of project 
processes. 
3.2 The effect of project processes on the technology 
As illustrated, the technology (ABS or BIPV) does not reside in some sort of vacuum.  Rather its technical 
performance and characteristics develop as a result of its local contextual setting (in this case construction 
project management) and vice versa.  This processual understanding of the nature of innovation and its 
adoption has highlighted several common aspects of project management which affect innovation and its 
performance [10] [11] [29].  Studies on processual innovation highlight the importance of the project 
management context, the management of decision-making within projects and the effect of shifting criteria 
during the course of a project.  In addition, research identifies the effect of the nature of project teams, the 
role of leadership and inter-organizational relationships.  These themes, which emerge from a processual 
understanding of innovation, resonate within the context of incorporating integrated technologies in building 
projects and mirror themes which have been identified in construction research.  The following section looks 
at the nature of construction projects and reflects the themes above within the context of construction, with a 
view to exploring both the processual and material elements of innovation adoption. 
3.2.1 The context of construction projects  
Construction projects have the distinctive characteristic of being both fragmented and systemic.  Their 
systemic nature comes from the number and interdependence of firms and actors involved in project 
procurement, ranging from architects, main contractors, and specialist consultants, to suppliers, designers 
and subcontractors.  The fragmented nature of construction is a result of the highly specialised and diverse 
nature of the projects it delivers.  Rather than being a stable, cohesive unit, construction projects involve 
temporary, multi-disciplinary, multi-firm projects teams, with different firms within a project having different 
priorities and sensitivities [3][12] .  Membership of the project team changes during the course of a 
construction project, with actors joining and leaving the team at different stages.  For example, it is normal 
for the main contractor’s firm to change its representative during different stages of the project, so the project 
manager at concept design is likely to be a different project manager to the one at detail design and different 
again during mobilisation and construction [12].  The supply chain of a construction project has a 
complicated series of relationships and obligations that are typically bounded through complex contractual 
arrangements [13].  Firms within the supply chain serve the main contractor or supplier, but also have their 
own ways of workings and their own alliances and interests.  Within the formal project arrangements and 
interdependencies, there are informal systems, relationships and procedures that further fragment the 
project team.  These characteristics, coupled with both formal and informal systems, relationships and 
procedures, make the process of innovation uptake in the construction context complicated. 
3.2.2 The management of projects, change and decisions 
The current dominate discourse within project management is entrenched in the classical sociological idea of 
logical or rational decision-making.  Increasingly however, research recognises that decisions within 
construction projects are taken with the involvement of many team members (with competing agendas), in 
the context of a social network, and include a technical element.  Whilst this network approach identifies 
characteristics of effective networks and suggests best practice for project decision making, it does not go 
further into identifying the impact that decisions have on the development of the technology or building. 
3.2.3 Shifting performance criteria 
Process innovation literature identifies types of criteria that run through the implementation phase of 
innovations.  These criteria do not operate in practise in the rational, linear manner described in the majority 
of the project management literature, but operate in a sometimes divergent manner which leads to periods 
where criteria shift as different information becomes available [14].  It is clear that these shifting criteria affect 
how decisions are taken over the course of a project, and that these decision chains will affect the materiality 
of the innovation and its context.  Thus project success is considered in terms of project completion 
schedules, budgets and client satisfaction, rather than technological performance.  
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3.2.4 The temporary and evolving nature of project teams 
The temporary and evolving nature of project teams have been shown to bring some advantages to projects 
in terms of new perspectives and competencies [15], but also involve issues with loss of information, 
expertise and common purpose.  These contributions to project management literature are largely in the 
form of suggestions for improved project team performance but, from the arguments above, will have a large 
effect on the decisions made, the criteria adopted and ultimately on the performance and configuration of the 
innovation itself. 
3.2.5 Leadership for innovation and uptake 
One view of innovation leadership sees counterbalancing roles of leadership which do not reflect personal 
characteristics of one project team member, but are shared among decision-making executives, leaders and 
managers [16].  Disagreement between these decision makers acts as a series of checks and balances 
during the project, showing that decisions are made pragmatically in response to changing conditions and 
the differing perspectives held by other top managers, rather than by planned course of action.  Within 
construction management circles the critical role of innovation leader or champion  in successful innovation 
has also been also been identified who drives through innovation and overseas challenges [17].  These two 
views add support to the notion that innovation champions have an important role to play in the adoption of 
innovation, but also that one person cannot necessarily guarantee the outcome. Given the autonomous and 
highly networked forms of construction projects, where work is carried out away from hierarchical 
environment of parent organisations, the practicality of either a single person fulfilling this role or a rational or 
collegiate decision-making processes undertaken by the project team must be questioned.  It also invites 
reflection – particularly in terms of technological innovation - on where leadership comes from in a project, 
who makes decisions in projects and what concerns or criteria frame their decisions.   
3.2.6 Inter-organisational relationships and the supply chain 
The complex inter-organisational relationships which occur on construction projects make the inclusion of 
innovative technologies on buildings difficult.  The challenge of adoption of sustainable technologies within 
the construction sector is often treated as a problem of project team and supply chain integration, with the 
focus being on professionals and their procedures and competencies (Specialist Engineering Alliance, 
2009).  While this perspective highlights important issues, the focus on professional roles and formal 
procedures obscures the complex decision-making processes which explain how and why the solutions are 
developed and implemented.  Little attention is paid to how innovative technologies involving cross-
disciplinary issues affect the building in which they are incorporated, or the processes by which they are 
installed.  What is missing is an understanding of how these interdependencies and the ways they are 
accommodated come together to shape both the technology and the building.  In summary, it is argued that 
engineers and technology developers struggle to design efficient BIPV components and systems, but that 
the project management and design practices can obstruct the realisation of these optimised technologies.  
This can result in a version of BIPV being installed, which is often not as imagined or anticipated by the 
technology developers and which does not deliver on its promise. 
4. Research design 
Having outlined some the themes and issues central to understanding the divergence between technological 
design and project realisation, the research uses these themes in the micro-level occurrences that occurred 
during the incorporation of BIPV into the projects.  Three building projects specifying BIPV were used as 
case studies.  In each case, the research followed the technology as it became stabilized and was 
incorporated into the building.  This allowed an understanding of the mutual interaction of technology and 
project management practices used by the stakeholders and the broader institutional logics of the 
construction sector.  Over the course of the projects, different project stakeholders were interviewed, paying 
particular attention to their experience of the decision-making processes they engaged in, as the inevitable 
series of problems and solutions arose during construction.  This series of events was then used to draw out 
the practicalities of incorporating BIPV into building projects.  Using socio-technical analysis [18], the 
research follows the negotiations, decision making and institutional norms/features, which play out during the 
course of projects.  As each narrative became clear, it was possible to see how project management 
processes impacted on the stabilization process of the technology and vice versa, thus enabling uptake to 
occur.  In doing so the research sought to offer insight into the institutional logics surrounding the integration 
of BIPV into the building envelope.  Theses insights were used to understand how decisions impacted on the 
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performance of the technology and what lessons could be learnt by developers, architects and project 
professionals. 
5. Three case study projects 
The case studies used were live new build projects in the UK that incorporated BIPV systems with similar 
characteristics (in terms of the type of PV cell and substrate).  The projects also used similar procurement 
contracts.  These similarities meant that a comparison could be made without the complication of a different 
set of technical and procurement problems.   
Vogue Terrace: A commercial office building in Central London which was part of a three-phase 
refurbishment project in which three adjacent blocks were reduced to a skeleton and then reconstructed.  
Although not exactly a new-build, the refurbishment was so extensive that it fulfilled the criteria of case 
selection.  BIPV technology was incorporated in the brise-soleil louvres on the south elevation of the 
building.  Vogue Terrace was the last of a three building development to be constructed from the early 
2000’s on.  Initial planning permission for Vogue Terrace was granted in 2007, work on site began in August 
2014, with work on the BIPV installation commencing in February 2015.   
Future Green: A commercial science hub set on a 24-acre site in a large science park development in 
Northern England.  The BIPV system was incorporated into the windows of the south elevation of the 
building.  Design for the project started in 2010, construction began in late 2013, the installation of BIPV was 
completed by August 2014 and the building was completed by November 2014.  The project was a joint 
partnership between a university, the City Council and several other partners.   
Synergy Court: This final case was an interdisciplinary biomedical research centre in Central London to 
serve a medical research partnership between three national research organisations and three universities.  
The BIPV system was incorporated into roof fins on the building.  Project planning began in 2001, with 
planning permission being granted in December 2010.  Ground works began in April 2011 and BIPV 
installation began in 2014, the estimated completion date being early 2016.   
6. Findings 
Each case was followed and analysed using the criteria outlined above.  This section reports solely upon the 
high level, over-arching, findings from the case studies which were developed from the ground up.  Whilst 
details illustrate and bring these headline stories to life, it is argued that their presence and relevance is of 
paramount importance to all project stakeholders.  
6.1 Changing interests and stakeholders (team members) affecting BIPV performance 
During each project it became clear that different project members (stakeholders) formed informal groups 
which coalesced around developing interests.  These informal groups transcended simple job titles or 
professional boundaries.  An example of this was that an interest group concerned with Generation 
Maximisation was at times made up of architects, designers, planners and engineers, but at other times only 
comprised of the designers and planners.  As such, the informal groups were temporary and fluid. 
What can be argued is that the informal membership of such groups within the projects shifted and changed 
with rhythms that sometimes followed the standard formal project stages (initial design, tender, detail design 
etc.) but sometimes followed a different pattern.  Thus, the mechanism for the forming of interest groups 
around a theme such as Generation Maximisation is difficult to pin down and includes many factors.  At 
various times in the project the dominance of some groups was amplified by project stages (for example 
Design Optimisers dominated the solution of problems at the detail design stage).  However at other times 
the dominance came from a source which was not obvious and which seemed to rise and then disappear, 
making the logic of decisions harder to follow.  An example of this is when decisions were taken that seemed 
to follow from an unwillingness to engage with the technology but were actually based on minimising risk. 
The data analysis forces us to consider that it was only when project stakeholders could see and understand 
which frame of reference was being used by other stakeholders, that integrated decision-making occurred.  
This view of decision-making allowed the implications of the current decision on generation as well as project 
schedule to be considered.  For example it was only when the construction manager in Synergy Court  
understood that the supplier of the BIPV louvres had concerns over meeting generation targets that project 
schedule was adjusted to allow for more detailed front end design of the BIPV system. 
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6.2 Identification of friction interfaces  
The friction interfaces, defined as where the BIPV assemblage (once it has become stabilised through the 
processes described in section 6.1) physically connects with the other parts/assemblages that form the 
completed building, were not apparent to the project teams from the outset.  The friction points where 
stumbled upon at unexpected points during the project.  The friction interfaces were experienced as a 
process, where unplanned mutual articulation of the BIPV assemblage and the rest of the building needed to 
take place.  The content of this articulation was the interrelationship and interdependence between the 
performance of the BIPV assemblage and the performance and appearance of the rest of the building. 
Vogue Terrace offers a useful example, relating to how the wiring from the BIPV louvres penetrated the 
building.  The architect envisioned that the wires would be incorporated into the window frames.  However, 
the façade supplier assumed that the wires would be taken externally across the building and run through 
one central point to the inverters.  The project manager had no idea that either of these views might be an 
issue – the architects solution threatened the integrity of the façade and the façade suppliers view affected 
the performance of the BIPV by introducing system losses.  In the end, through lengthy negotiations, a 
compromise was reached with redesigned brackets holding the frames, running cables vertically up the 
building and installing inverters on the roof, rather than inside the building.  The manufacturer of the 
brackets, nor many of the stakeholders, had no idea of this and would not have assumed that their brackets 
would be part of the problem, or be the chosen focus for the solution.  Likewise, the re-location of the 
inverters to the roof had implications for many of the other elements that went to form the completed 
building.  The knock on effects on the programme and site logistics could not really have been foreseen.   
This illustration shows how both the building and the technology were affected by the friction interface, and 
how the building needs to be viewed as a complete system, whereby every component has the potential to 
influence and reshape the building design and other components.  This finding bring to the fore the notion of 
co-development of the building (with all its component technologies and parts) and the BIPV system.  In 
doing so attention is drawn to the role of contracts, guarantees, schedules and risk in decision making which 
obscured technological implications and prevented integrated development of the building and technology. 
6.3 Conflicting logics of project management and the technical system (BIPV)  
The analysis of the case studies drew attention to the sector’s established ‘plans of work’ e.g. the RIBA and 
construction project procurement processes which by their nature seek standardisation and separation.  
Once identified as key variables, it became clear that these institutional logics had a strong relationship with 
the development and adoption of a bespoke BIPV system (in the UK BIPV has no off-the shelf solution).   
All three case study projects were based on Design and Build contracts with clear project stages and 
processes, based upon institutional logics of the sector.  In two of the case studies, these standard 
processes (institutional logics) - of developing work packages and selecting firms to tender - had a 
profoundly negative effect on the design and integration of the BIPV system as part of the building.  Early 
division of design work between mechanical and electrical disciplines, and the very early development of 
work packages before detail BIPV system design had taken place, made it difficult to integrate all the 
elements of the BIPV system and for an assessment of the whole BIPV system performance to take place.  
By contrast, in Synergy Court the contractor concerned refused to quote on the BIPV system unless the 
detail design of a complete system was carried out prior to tender (using a pre contract service arrangement 
or PCSA).  This resulted in the redrafting of the work package to include both mechanical and electrical 
elements of the design and the BIPV contract was subsequently awarded on a turnkey basis.  The resulting 
system design was very different from the original design, using different PV technology from the original 
specification and incorporated over 600 micro-inverters.  
The arguments from the data illustrate that a BIPV system cannot be efficiently designed if mechanical and 
electrical packages remain separated.  A simple analogy would be trying to design car whereby the engine 
and gearbox engineers are contractually separated and working in isolation, and whilst also working in 
isolation of the rest of the production team.  Thus, the project management processes used in three case 
studies have not developed fast enough, to accommodate innovative technologies such as BIPV.  Similarly, 
the process of awarding of contracts relied on previous relationships (based upon a traditional separation of 
mechanical and electrical) which adversely affected the contractor’s ability to deliver the work package.    
The effect of issuing the contracts for the BIPV was evident at the design and installation stage, where the 
siloed way of working within work packages created artificial boundaries between parts of the BIPV system 
and those stakeholders engaged in the rest of the building.  Façade installers did not consider the way that 
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wires would penetrate the façade until close to installation and the siting of cable runs and inverters was not 
considered by the main contractor until the main electrical work was carried out.  It would seem that the 
contracts generated artificial boundaries between the stakeholders which were not picked up by the project 
design coordinator role.  These examples demonstrate how the conflicting priorities of project management 
and the early design of technical details of the integrated technologies are in tension with each other. 
7. Discussion: Implications for Advanced Building Skins 
The arguments point toward some very real challenges for the project stakeholders in a number of forms, 
central to which are the institutional logics that have come to represent the construction sector.  ABS, as a 
technology or product, are currently dealt with by the construction sector (these institutional logics) as 
uniform, standardized, stable physical artefacts with a clear manufacturer and expert knowledge [19], 
However, the empirical evidence from this research contradicts such a view offering a different version of 
reality.  This version of reality is far more aligned with the socio-technical nature of trying to create and 
implement an Advanced Building Skin, which extends way beyond viewing the technical aspects in a 
vacuum [18].  Understanding this is essential for stakeholders, but especially so for engineers and product 
designers, as they try to turn their designs into a physical reality that forms part of a finished building.  Much 
of the Project Management literature and certainly the work plans and contractual arrangement processes 
used within the construction sector appear still to be embedded in assuming rationale and logical decisions 
with complete and perfect information in a stable contextual setting.  Clearly, such rational assumptions 
simply do not fit the world experienced by the practitioners involved in this research.  Thus, the empirical 
evidence from this research pushes back and challenges the rational perspective, whilst emphasising the 
iterative socio-technical nature of the process of innovation uptake.  
Currently there is dearth of research seeking to emphasise this headline point raised by this work.  However, 
recent years has seen an acknowledgement of these arguments within the Project Management literature, 
with a call to move away from rational and logical traditions.  Some academics have championed the need 
for Project Management literature to reconsider its approach, calling for a shift from the traditional problem 
solving to more of a problem structuring approaches which can be seen to resonate with these research 
findings ([20], [27], [28]).  Pollack’s on-going work [28], whilst not about advanced building skins or BIPV, 
resonates strongly with the reality of the stakeholders that were part of this research and the need to rethink 
the process of which they have become part of and how a project should be managed. 
The project management literature is not alone in seeking to move the body of knowledge beyond the 
rational and logical.  Indeed, the traditional construction management literature has begun to acknowledge 
and now champion the competencies required for the project stakeholders of today and tomorrow.  Dainty et 
al. [21] argued that project stakeholders do not need yet more hard technical tools, models, software etc but 
in fact greater soft skills based around different competency models.  Again, whilst such arguments don’t 
focus upon advanced building skins or BIPV per se, they strongly resonate with headline findings of this 
research and the need to rethink how we approach projects and the skills stakeholders need.   
Thus, the research points toward an increasing need to consider the building design as a whole system, 
where every single component which forms each assemblage which then goes to form a completed building 
are considered together.  Currently the institutional logics of the construction sectors adversely impact the 
opportunities of achieving this.  It is argued here that these institutional logics manifest in part as 
fragmentation, categorization, separation and specialisation of actors, organizations, processes and 
technology (which in part seek to manage the ‘risks’ through contracts, guarantees and penalties etc) are 
now a long way behind the needs of the complex technologies being developed today.  In effect these 
institutional logics are now hindering innovative practice and the uptake of innovation on projects especially 
those as complex as advanced building skins and certainly BIPV.  Three key findings emerged to support 
this assertion and these are outlined in the following sections. 
7.1 Project team members and the technology 
The findings support research which seeks to move away from the study of problem solving in favour of 
exploring the way that different project actors bring different perspectives to problem solving (problem 
structuring) [21].  This is often done through a process perspective aligned with socio-technical thinking and 
makes a new contribution in highlighting the way that these perspectives shift during the project.  
Olson et al [22] argued that changes to project group membership have a direct impact upon patterns of 
cooperation between members.  This is further compounded, when those project group members are 
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seeking to negotiate and define a new technology (the BIPV) with competing and indeed at time changing 
interests in this case BIPV.  This research supports Olson et al.[22] whilst adding to the debate emphasising 
fluctuations.  Decision-making tended to be taken over by practical demands at key moments in time, by the 
decision makers involved in the project at that given time and their interests, without reflection on the 
implications for the BIPV system.  Interestingly, there were times of relative stability punctuated by times of 
extreme disruption.  These changes are however not occurring in a vacuum but were interrelated.  Emerging 
changes surrounding how the BIPV was defined and understood within a given project setting.  At other 
times the dominant power driving the uptake came from a source which was not obvious and which seemed 
to rise and then disappear, making the logic of decisions harder to follow, something that resonates with the 
challenges when studying teams experienced by Emmitt and Gorse [23].  Central to all of this, was the 
processual and ongoing fluidity of the members of the project team and their thinking around certain interests 
in shaping the technology (the BIPV).  The case of BIPV challenges a number of assumptions which inform 
research into innovation in general and sustainable innovation in particular and certainly within a project 
management context.  In much of the literature, innovation, product development, commercialisation and 
adoption are treated as distinct stages in a linear process [24].  This research demonstrates that although 
project management procedures often assume this linear progression, the reality is very different with 
significant innovation and change happening very late in the construction process.  
Having discussed the points above, it is important to also see the context within which the project 
stakeholders are operating rather than simply placing blame at their feet.  The complexity of the project and 
the standard project processes tended to take the attention of the project manager, client and contractors 
away from the generation targets of the BIPV system and privileged what has traditionally been seen as part 
of the golden triangle of project management, scheduling and costs of the project [25].   
7.2 Friction interfaces (BIPV and other building assemblages) 
The friction interfaces between the BIPV and the other building assemblages are a central point for the 
discussion.  To be clear, friction interfaces occurs once the BIPV has become stabilised through the 
negotiations (already described).   
The friction points where stumbled upon, and stumbled upon at unexpected points as the project proceeded.  
The friction points were experienced as a process, whereby unplanned mutual articulation of the BIPV 
assemblage and the rest of the building needed to take place.  These were not however experienced in a 
linear, rational or logic manner, thus contradicting much of the project management tradition.  Instead, the 
friction interfaces resonate with shifts in project management [27] and the process, on-going, iterative 
approach to project management and problem structuring as argued by Pollack [28].  Furthermore, analysis 
of the co-development of the building, with all its component technologies and parts (of which the BIPV 
system is just one), drew attention to the institutional logics of the sector.  Especially relevant was the role of 
contracts, guarantees, schedules and risk in decision making and these effectively hampered the process.  
This resonates strongly with the constant discourse within both academia and the construction sector for 
improved project delivery methods based upon process thinking and moving beyond instrumental, overly 
generic improvement agendas and best practice recipes that have little bearing in real life situations 
experienced by project stakeholders [30], [31].   
The points made thus far of course have real power and agency.  In that the changes to the design of the 
BIPV system show that the system envisaged at the start is not necessarily that which is delivered.  Design 
personnel change, the rationale for decisions is lost as project personnel change and the expertise of 
contractors varies hugely across the industry.  Innovative technologies are particularly vulnerable to this 
rolling change as friction interfaces and technical understandings are unclear often leading to an unfair critic. 
Key issues include product standardisation and the integration of the building process.  In the UK, as long as 
BIPV remains a bespoke product, conflicts between project efficiency and technological performance will 
remain in potential tension.  One way forward might be to develop a suite of BIPV systems to respond to 
different types of customer and building needs (for example, developing options for high generation potential, 
aesthetic high transparency applications, and integrated façade panels), accompanied by much clearer 
communication of the technical issues involved as well as of the trade-offs between different considerations.  
7.3 Conflicting priorities on an uneven and shifting playing field 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the conflicting priorities of the project stakeholders with the role played 
by the contextual setting of the sector.  A number of aspects of the BIPV system posed challenges for the 
stakeholders within the construction projects.  These included either a failure or conflicting understandings of 
10 
 
the fully integrated nature of the technology.  This challenged the stakeholder’s modus operandi, a finding 
that is understandable due to the embedded practices of the construction sector.    
Traditional approaches have viewed the contextual setting of a project, firm or the sector as static, something 
of a blank canvas upon innovation and improvement agendas are deployed or installed on (refs).  The 
empirical findings of this research paint a very different picture.  Fortunately, more recently there has been a 
growing, yet still small, body of literature acknowledging and championing the fact that the contextual setting 
is actually an active variable, something this research resonates with strongly [30], [31], [32].  Therefore, 
effectively what we have is a very complex system (the BIPV) being designed on a live project, whilst at the 
same time influencing and also being influenced by the unfolding design of the rest of the building, all with 
conflicting priorities.  This is occurring with changing project stakeholders, changing interests and priorities 
over time.  Central to our understanding is this is not occurring within a vacuum.  Importantly, the contextual 
setting of the project and the logics of the construction sector play a role.   
Having accepted that the contextual setting of the project and the broader construction sector play a role, it is 
argued this is further complicated because that contextual setting itself is not static, but an active variable 
both shaping and being re-shaped by the processes undertaken [30].  Procurement methods change, 
planning restrictions change, available budgets change, regulations change and so on.  A small group have 
long championed the need to see beyond the sector as a static blank canvas upon which work plans, 
innovation or improvement agendas are deployed, but rather an active variable [21], [30], [31], [33].  
8. Concluding Comments 
This research set out to understand the uptake of an ABS, namely BIPV.  In doing so, the research 
deconstructed the practicalities of incorporating BIPV in a building project.  This was done by privileging the 
stakeholders (including engineers and product developers) involved and looking beyond professional 
boundaries in order to understand the interests that formed around BIPV at different times and how 
negotiations unfolded given the project complexities and institutional logics of the construction sector.  It was 
through those negotiations that the BIPV design became stabilized, forming part of the finished building.  The 
research is timely and relevant as buildings continue to become increasingly complex and greater demands 
placed upon what is expected of an ABS.  The research helps all stakeholders to understand the challenges 
and opportunities that integrating ABS into the building envelope brings and the complex processes involved.  
By seeking to understand the reality experienced by a number of stakeholders involved in the uptake of BIPV 
the research championed the fact that the contextual setting of the broader construction sector, and its’ 
institutional logics, conspire against the delivery of a successful BIPV system.  Analysis of the case studies 
demonstrated several key challenges associated with the uptake of integrated technologies in construction 
projects.  These challenges broadly fall under three banners: project processes, the evolving nature of 
complex system design and the locus of technical expertise.  These challenges apply to the adoption of 
other ABS, where the integrated nature of the technology presents similar complexities.   
The headline from this research is simple; all stakeholders, but especially engineers and technology 
developers, need to understand and push back against the institutional logics of the construction section if 
their envisaged innovations (in this case BIPV) are to be realised.  Findings show that BIPV expertise 
resides in diffuse pools of different types of knowledge and rarely comes together in cohesive product 
development or design.  Currently, engineers and product developers can design what appears to be an 
efficient BIPV system on paper.  However, the processes through which the design must then pass for 
uptake to actually occur within a building morphs the design into something else (often lesser) than initially 
considered.  Practitioners could focus on understanding the technology as a system rather than focussing on 
individual components.  In the case of BIPV, like many types of ABS, there is no single product and there is 
no single expert.  Instead, it is argued that the expertise for ABS resides in diffuse pools of different types of 
knowledge.  A range of institutional logics (professional boundaries, contracts and so on) which shape the 
construction sector currently silos those diffuse pools of knowledge.  This siloing allows ‘issues’ to slip 
through the cracks or creates barriers.  Project managers should consider where the expertise resides, 
rather than making assumptions about the technology.  The informal role of systems integrator is key in the 
design and installation of BIPV.  This role can reside across multiple actors through a project but caution is 
required as it can give the false impression that someone is designing the system as a whole, whilst in fact it 
is evolving on an ad-hoc basis.  This failure has the potential to bring innovations like BIPV under unfair 
criticism for underperforming or having an adverse effect on the cost, time and overall design of a building.   
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Finally, until technology developers understand how construction processes unfold and until construction 
processes take innovative integrated technologies into account, the divergence between technological 
benefit and project efficiency will only increase.  
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